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The drive for a multilateral trade agree-
ment encompassing the Americas gained
momentum about two years ago, with the U.S.
Congress poised to grant the president fast-track
authority to negotiate Chile’s inclusion in the
North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA). But the series of severe financial crises
that rattled the world almost immediately upon
NAFTA’s inception frustrated the fast-lane
approach and slowed progress toward the
agreement. Perhaps this delay reflected that pol-
icymakers, businesspeople, and even the gen-
eral public were reconsidering the benefits of
trade agreements with crisis-prone partners.
With the prospect of agreement post-
poned indefinitely, would countries in the area
benefit from lowering, even if unilaterally, their
trade barriers? This is the issue addressed in this
series of two articles begun in the third quarter
1999 Economic and Financial Review.
Part 1 concluded that static applied general
equilibrium models could make a mild case for
unilateral trade liberalization. However, the arti-
cle raised the possibility that dynamic models,
which incorporate the dimension of time, might
do substantially better. That conjecture was par-
tially inspired by numerical experiments with
models in which the level of capital after the tariff
reduction is changed exogenously (from outside
the model).
For example, a static applied general equi-
librium model by KPMG Peat Marwick (1991)
delivers larger welfare gains when the level of
capital in Mexico is increased exogenously to
make the rate of return to capital the same both
before and after NAFTA. The study starts by
assuming that the level of capital is the same
before and after the inception of NAFTA.
Mexico’s gains from NAFTA are negligible in
this exercise, the equivalent variation of 0.32
percent of GNP.
1 But the assumption of a con-
stant level of capital implies a higher real rate of
return to capital after NAFTA. Because this is an
unrealistic outcome under free capital mobility,
the study lets capital rise to the level needed to
ensure that the rate of return  is the same before
and after NAFTA. Under this assumption, the
welfare gain is equal to 4.6 percent in GNP.
2
Two qualifying comments are in order.
First, the capital increase necessary to make the
rate of return the same before and after NAFTA
is about 8 percent, which is substantial and, for
all we know, has not yet materialized, even six
years after NAFTA’s inception. Second, this
expansion in capital is introduced from outside
the model. It is impossible to determine, there-
fore, whether this new capital level is consistent
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with the optimal consumption (and, thus, sav-
ing) decisions of the agents populating the arti-
ficial economy. To answer this question, it is
necessary to formulate dynamic models that not
only lay out the microeconomic foundations of
consumers’ and firms’ behavior by specifying
preferences, endowments, and technology but
also incorporate the dimension of time in their
decisions. The solution to consumers’ and firms’
maximization problems will dictate the society’s
desired level of savings and, therefore, of capi-
tal, after trade reform. In other words, in
dynamic models the level of capital following a
trade reform is determined endogenously—that
is, within the model—rather than in some ad
hoc fashion from outside of it.
Part 2 of this series investigates the extent
to which applied dynamic general equilibrium
models deliver on their promise of large welfare
gains from unilateral trade liberalization.
APPLIED DYNAMIC GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM
MODELS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
Applied dynamic general equilibrium
models, unlike static ones, can address invest-
ment issues because they introduce the dimen-
sion of time in consumers’ and firms’ decisions.
As a result, consumers can postpone consump-
tion today and save to be able to consume more
tomorrow. Recall that in dynamic general equi-
librium models, in contrast to static ones, capi-
tal accumulation is determined endogenously
rather than exogenously.
Operationally, this difference between the
models is most apparent in the utility function
and budget constraint used to represent con-
sumers’ behavior. Intuition suggests that a sim-
ple dynamic version of the static utility function
presented in Part 1 could be
where ci denotes real consumption of good i, α i
is a parameter that measures the relative impor-
tance the representative consumer attaches to
each good, t indexes the time of consumption,
and β is the factor by which consumers discount
the future, with 0 < β < 1.
This formulation of the utility function
conveys the idea that consuming a unit of a
good in the future is less attractive than con-
suming this same unit today. Postponing con-
sumption is costly in terms of utility, and that is
why a bundle of goods consumed today yields
utility ∑ α i log ci, while that same bundle con-
sumed tomorrow yields the utility β ∑ α i log ci.
(Recall that β < 1 by assumption.)






The intertemporal dimension of the prob-
lem also appears in consumers’ budget con-
straint, which typically takes the form
for each period t, where yt is the household’s
endowment in terms of, say, good 1; bt is the
household’s net holding of assets measured also
in terms of good 1 (positive if the household is
a net creditor, negative if it is a net debtor) at
the beginning of period t; and rt–1 is the real
interest rate consumers receive (if net lenders)
or pay (if net borrowers) on their previous-
period asset holdings.
Rearranging the equation as
makes it apparent that bt is the current period
savings: the excess of revenues from all sources,
the endowment yt, and interest payments from
assets (1 + rt–1)bt–1, minus current consumption
of goods and services, ∑ i pit cit.
The presence of savings in the budget
constraint makes clear that, in contrast to the
static case, a consumer can now borrow or lend
(depending on whether a negative or a positive
bt is chosen) to increase or decrease consump-
tion from the level that current income would
otherwise permit.
In a dynamic setting, the consumer’s prob-
lem is no longer to choose the single consump-
tion bundle ci, but rather, the whole sequence
of consumption bundles {ci,t}
∞
t=0 that maximizes
utility. Correspondingly, the consumer will
choose the sequence of asset holdings {bi,t}
∞
t=0
consistent with the ability to finance that opti-
mal consumption stream.
Technical Challenges of International Trade
Models with Endogenous Capital Accumulation
The addition of the dynamic dimension
could potentially increase welfare because the
removal of tariffs can prompt a decline in the
cost of the imported goods used in the produc-
tion of domestic capital goods. The correspond-
ing declines in the unit cost of production of cap-
ital goods and, therefore, in their prices provide
the necessary incentives for a higher rate of
investment. The resulting expansion of the capi-
tal stock increases labor productivity and, hence,
the output of consumer goods and services. But
the introduction of the temporal dimension also
raises technical complications worth exploring to
understand the limitations of the measures of the
benefits from trade liberalization reported below.
One of the challenges facing international
economists is the problem posed by a constant
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discount factor, β . The assumption of a constant
discount factor is standard in many intertemporal
models but is problematic in international appli-
cations, particularly for small open economies.
This is because models with a constant β usually
generate an explosive (implosive) consumption
path, in the sense that consumption as a fraction
of income constantly increases (declines) over
time. Such paths are highly counterfactual, as
consumption–income ratios tend to be stable in
actual economies.
The reasons for the odd outcome are out-
lined in the box entitled “Undesirable Implications
of the Constant Discount Factor Assumption.” Here,
it suffices to say the source of the mischief is the
combination of a constant discount factor and the
small open economy assumption. Under this latter
assumption, a small economy is capable of bor-
rowing and lending unlimited amounts at a con-
stant world interest rate. Of course, this assump-
tion is a good approximation to reality only within
certain limits. Eventually, if the economy keeps
borrowing without bounds, it will absorb all
worldwide available savings, at which point the
economy will cease to be small and either the
interest rate will rise or the country will be unable
to continue borrowing.
International economists dealing with
dynamic models—that is, models of endoge-
nous capital accumulation—have tried to solve
the problems created by the small open econ-
omy assumption in several ways. One popular
route has been to abandon the assumption, in
Equation 1, that the discount factor, β, is constant
over time and assume instead that it is a func-
tion of consumption.
3 Mathematically, such an
assumption is represented as
β = β (ct),
which says the discount factor, β, at any point
in time is a function of consumption.
As the box explains, this alternative
assumption may give rise to stationary out-
comes—that is, to equilibria with constant con-
sumption–output ratios. Applied dynamic gen-
eral equilibrium models typically assume the
function β (ct) decreases in ct. In other words, as
consumption increases, β decreases. This is not
an entirely satisfactory specification because
there is little evidence that people discount the
future more as they become richer.
4
Goulder and Eichengreen (1992) offer a
different solution to the problem posed by the
combination of the small open economy
assumption and a constant β . Instead of postu-
lating a variable β , they introduce financial
assets (wealth) as a determinant of the utility or
welfare function. In particular, they propose
evaluating the welfare gains from free trade
according to the formula
where α and σ are standard parameters in the lit-
erature, assumed to have values that ensure the
concavity of the utility function, and bs is a com-
posite of foreign and domestic assets in real
terms.
5 This solves the problem of the lack of sta-
tionarity when β is constant because assets are
treated as just another good and subject to decreas-
ing marginal utility. This will generally ensure a
stationary wealth–income ratio and generate a
stationary consumption–income ratio as well.
6
The idea of including financial assets in
the welfare function is not new. In fact, many
models studying monetary policy issues assume
that money, an asset, is a determinant of the
utility function. This practice has met with
objections because what utility functions such
as that in Equation 2 say, if interpreted literally,
is that consumers derive pleasure from the mere
fact of holding money or bond issues. This is a
highly unattractive proposition, as consumers
clearly do not derive utility from the pieces of
paper but from what they can buy.
7
Thus, international economists face the
difficulty that the assumption of a constant dis-
count factor standard in closed macroeconomic
models is unappealing when applied to small
open economies, because it tends to produce
the counterfactual outcome that consumption as
a fraction of income permanently declines or
increases. This prediction has typically been
eliminated at the cost of counterintuitive prefer-
ences, a factor that must be taken into account
in evaluating the quantitative results of the
applied dynamic general equilibrium models
reported in the next section.
Welfare Gains from Trade Liberalization
in Applied Dynamic General Equilibrium Models
Progress in quantifying the benefits of free
trade with dynamic models has been slow
because of the theoretical difficulties discussed 
above and other computational issues. The few
such models available have a mixed record.
Goulder and Eichengreen (1992) find that
a U.S. move to unilateral free trade by removing
tariffs from an average rate of 4 percent would
cut consumption 0.32 percent, which in turn
implies a welfare loss equal to 0.44 percent of
GDP.
8 The larger welfare gains dynamic models
anticipate do not materialize, therefore, in
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Undesirable Implications of the Constant Discount Factor Assumption
A constant discount factor in combination with
time-separable additive utility functions like the one
represented in Equation 1 of the text can lead to
counterfactual implications for the consumption
path of the model economy.
As explained, in a dynamic setting a con-





subject to the intertemporal budget constraint
ct = y + (1 + rt–1) bt–1 – bt,
where all symbols are as in the text, the endow-
ment y is a constant, the real interest sequence 
{rt–1}
∞
t=0 is exogenous, and there is only one good (i
= 1), with its units redefined so its price is 1.The
solution to this problem will be the selection of a
consumption sequence {ci,t}
∞
t=0 and an asset-hold-
ing sequence {bt}
∞
t=0 consistent with the ability to
finance that optimal consumption stream.
Substituting into the utility function the expres-
sion for ct given by the budget constraint yields the
maximization problem
Max {β
t ln[y + (1 + rt–1) bt–1 – bt] 
+ β




t+j+2 ln[y + (1 + rt+j+1) bt+j+1 – bt+j+2]},
where the choice variable is bt in period t, bt+1 in
period t+1, bt+2 in period t+2, and so on, and j and
t are time indexes.
The first-order necessary condition with
respect to bt corresponding to this maximization
problem is
Dividing both sides by β t and using the budget
constraint again, the following equivalent expres-
sion results:
which, assuming that rt = r, a constant, takes the
form
ct+1 = β *(1 + r )*ct .
Assuming, for convenience only, that income is
constant over time, the above condition can be rep-
resented in terms of consumption–income ratios as
In a stationary equilibrium, prices and real
consumption–income ratios are constant over time.
This implies that the above condition in any station-
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or, equivalently, that β (1 + r) = 1.This condition
will typically be satisfied only by chance. More 
generally, either β (1 + r) < 1 or β (1 + r) > 1. In
the first case, Equation 1 implies that consumption
in each period will be lower than in the previous
one by the factor β (1 + r). In other words, the 
consumption–income ratio will decrease monotoni-
cally to 0. In the second case, the opposite is true:
the consumption–income ratio increases monotoni-
cally over time.The problem is that the implication
of the dynamic model in either of these cases is
grossly counterfactual, because observed con-
sumption–income ratios are very stable over time.
As the text mentions, one possible way out of
this problem is to abandon the assumption of a
constant discount factor and assume, instead, that
it is a decreasing function of consumption.This can
be seen intuitively by replacing the function β with
β (ct) in Equation B.1:
Suppose that the function β (ct) is decreasing
in ct and that for certain value c of ct, β (ct) (1 + r) >
1.This implies ct+1 > ct = c, which in turn implies
that β (ct+1) < β (ct) and, therefore, that β (ct+1) (1 + r) 
< β (ct) (1 + r). In other words, as consumption
increases, β (ct+1) decreases, and so does
β (ct+1)(1 + r) until eventually β (ct+n)(1 + r) = 1
for n large enough. At that point consumption
becomes stationary (in the sense that it repeats
itself over time) because
However, this way of solving the lack of sta-
tionary equilibria in dynamic models with constant
discount factor β is somewhat of a mechanical
quick fix.Typically, any function β (ct) will be contin-
uous and, therefore, decreasing for some values of
ct (or eventually all of them, as in the example
above). At the same time, in any reasonable eco-
nomic model, consumers want to consume more
the wealthier they are.This implies that when β (ct)
is decreasing in consumption, it is also decreasing
in wealth or, equivalently, that households become
more impatient to consume as they get wealthier.
Unfortunately, there is no empirical evidence to
support this rather ad hoc assumption.The oppo-
site and equally arbitrary assumption that β (ct) is
increasing in ct—that is, that a household’s desire
to accumulate wealth rises as it becomes richer—
cannot be empirically validated either (and intro-
duces the additional technical difficulties mentioned
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Those gains do seem to materialize—at
least for developing countries—in a recent
model by Ahearne (1999). It is one of the few
dynamic models to quantitatively analyze uni-
lateral trade liberalization’s effects for develop-
ing countries. Unfortunately, Ahearne focuses
on the performance of macroeconomic vari-
ables such as aggregate output, consumption,
and investment and does not report a measure
of welfare, such as that Goulder and
Eichengreen report. This omission makes wel-
fare comparison of the two studies difficult. In
any case, to the extent the direction of change
of consumption and welfare are the same (as
they are in Goulder and Eichengreen), Ahearne’s
outcomes are more favorable to trade reform.
He finds that lowering tariffs from an average of
25 percent to 10 percent would result in an
increase in consumption of about 3 percent. A
reduction to an average rate of 5 percent would
raise consumption growth to about 4.5 percent,
while the complete removal of tariffs would
result in a 6 percent consumption increase.
Six percent consumption growth is by no
means negligible and could be seen as an indi-
cation that dynamic models can, after all, deliver
larger welfare gains from unilateral trade liber-
alization than their static counterparts. However,
it is important to emphasize that the relatively
large consumption growth of 6 percent is ob-
tained from removing tariffs originally assumed
to be 25 percent. Ahearne’s study suggests that
consumption growth will be a more moderate 
1 percent to 2 percent if the average initial 
tariff is 4 percent, as in Goulder-Eichengreen.
9
Still, this increase in consumption after trade 
liberalization seems to reverse Goulder and
Eichengreen’s negative finding.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to pinpoint the
source of the opposite results of these two
dynamic models because their features are quite
different, from the specification of the utility
function to the underlying assumptions about
capital mobility.
10 For example, Ahearne’s
assumption is that the discount factor depends
on the level of wealth (or equivalently, con-
sumption), while Goulder and Eichengreen
assume that assets enter into the utility function.
Another important difference is that
Ahearne assumes the terms of trade are exoge-
nous. Thus, changes in tariffs alter the relative
domestic prices but do not change the interna-
tional terms of trade against the country that 
liberalizes. This is not the case in Goulder and
Eichengreen because they adopt the so-called
Armington, or national product differentiation,
assumption. As Part 1 explained, this assump-
tion is introduced mainly to account for the puz-
zling “cross-hauling” in which many countries
appear to export the same goods they import.
11
National product differentiation circumvents this
problem by assuming each country is the only
producer of the good it exports. However, this
also means tariffs could help a country exploit
its market power. Tariff elimination might be
damaging in this case because the optimal tariff
typically is not zero under this assumption. This
fundamental bias against free trade is absent
from Ahearne’s model but seems to prevail in
Goulder and Eichengreen’s.
12
There are reasons to doubt the welfare
losses Goulder and Eichengreen’s model deliv-
ers because their preferences include assets as a
determinant of the welfare function. The result-
ing welfare measure may reflect consumption
changes as much as changes in asset holdings.
This is certainly an unappealing way to measure
welfare, in light of the general equilibrium the-
ory standard that consumers do not derive util-
ity directly from merely holding assets but from
the stream of goods and services those assets
can purchase.
Ahearne’s study may exaggerate the GDP
growth from unilateral trade liberalization
because he assumes perfect capital mobility.
This may not be the case in practice, as evi-
dence suggests that households tend to invest
their savings in their home country rather than
in foreign ones. Goulder and Eichengreen cap-
ture more aptly this reality by assuming that
consumers have a bias for domestic assets, and
this implicitly limits the capital mobility respon-
sible for the relatively large GDP and consump-
tion gains in Ahearne’s model.
13
PRODUCT VARIETY AND GAINS
FROM TRADE LIBERALIZATION
It was argued that dynamic models of
international trade have the potential to deliver
the large welfare gains from trade liberalization
that their static counterparts have failed to pro-
duce. The preceding section suggests that
dynamic models cannot fulfill those expecta-
tions either, except under nonconventional rep-
resentation of consumers’ preferences.
However, one often-heard criticism of all
the models discussed so far is that they fail to
incorporate the idea that free trade makes pos-
sible access to new technologies that enhance
the economy’s overall productivity. Perhaps this
is why dynamic general equilibrium models
produce only less-than-striking welfare gains
from unilateral trade liberalization.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 34
Consider, for example, the constant-
returns-to-scale production function presented
in Part 1 of this series:
where Y is aggregate output, L the amount of
labor input, K the amount of capital input, and
0 < α < 1.
In this specification, the total factor pro-
ductivity, represented by A, is treated as a given
parameter, invariant to the trade regime. There-
fore, this equation does not capture the idea
that trade liberalization will increase an econ-
omy’s overall productivity. Trade liberalization
can raise production only if it leads to the use
of more labor or capital inputs.
14 Otherwise, the
same amount of labor and capital will produce
exactly the same amount of output.
A similar situation arises with the second
kind of technology, the increasing-returns-
to-scale technology—or, equivalently, decreasing-
average-cost technology—considered in Part 1:
(4) Total cost = F + bQ.
Again, notice that tariff policy changes can
reduce average costs only if they induce an
increase in the quantity of the good. But the
basic cost structure, defined by fixed cost F or
marginal cost b, is the same regardless of the
tariff regime under which countries operate.
This invariance of the overall productivity
to the trade regime implicit in conventional pro-
duction functions has been challenged on sev-
eral grounds. For instance, an important benefit
of international trade is that it gives consumers
more choices and offers producers more
options in terms of inputs. The advantage of
variety is particularly important for economies
that can produce only a limited range of goods
on their own. This is the case with economies
characterized by cost functions such as the one
in Equation 4—that is, economies with increas-
ing returns to scale.
Recall from the discussion in Part 1 that in
such economies each good is produced by one
and only one firm. The number of varieties is
determined by the number of firms, which is lim-
ited when there are increasing returns to scale.
To see this, suppose all firms must pay the fixed
cost F in terms of a primary input z (for example,
land) and that each economy is endowed with Z
units of that good. Each economy on its own will
be able to produce, at most, Z/F varieties of
goods (for simplicity, we assume Z/F is an inte-
ger). The number of goods produced domesti-
cally will be limited by that upper bound.
15
Thus, suppose prohibitively high tariffs or
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restrictions limiting quantities make trade
between two economies disappear. This implies
that consumers must make do with domestic
goods. Although a consumer would like that 27-
inch-screen TV and can afford it, he will have to
settle for the smaller domestic model without
remote control. Likewise, local producers will
have to adjust their technologies to the interme-
diate inputs domestic firms make available. A
construction company may prefer a special kind
of foreign-made insulation for a building that
will have to withstand extreme temperatures,
but the firm will have to use a more expensive
and less functional building design to achieve
the same results with the less suitable insulators
produced domestically.
Next, suppose all barriers to international
trade are lifted. Firms in this economy will be
able to use both domestic and foreign inputs.
The examples above suggest that a larger vari-
ety of goods, especially of intermediate inputs,
may be associated with aggregate productivity
gains not appropriately captured by conven-
tional production functions.
To confront this limitation, economists
have started to play with less conventional pro-
duction functions that incorporate the idea of
productivity gains from variety. Such production
functions can be constructed by a clever rein-
terpretation of the conventional constant-
returns-to-scale production functions.
For simplicity, assume only one final con-
sumption good is produced with the technology
where L represents the amount of labor input, xi
represents the quantity of an intermediate input
i, i = 1, 2, …, M, and 0 < α < 1. Assuming each
intermediate input is used in the same quan-
tity,
16 the technology can be rewritten as
This appears to be the same old constant-
returns-to-scale technology of Equation 3, with
capital, K, relabeled x and the total factor pro-
ductivity,  A, relabeled M. Indeed, increasing
both the amount of labor input L and the typical
intermediate input x by h percent would raise
production of the consumption good by h per-
cent, which is exactly what is supposed to occur
with a constant-returns-to-scale technology.
The trick is that relabeling A as M is not as
innocuous as it might appear because now A is
not necessarily fixed. In fact, A (or  M)—the
number of varieties—can be regarded as an
input, just as L or each xi is. In other words,
according to this production function, aggregate
() . 5
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production of final goods Y requires combining
three inputs: the number of varieties of inter-
mediate inputs (M), the quantity used of each
of them (x), and labor (L).
The reinterpretation of A as the number of
intermediate-input varieties represents mathe-
matically the old idea that one-size-fits-all
economies will be less productive than highly
specialized ones. The intuition is that access to
a larger variety of goods will make it more likely
that producers will find inputs that better fit the
characteristics of their production lines and that
consumers will find the products that best fit
their tastes and needs.
17
The gains-from-variety effect can be better
understood by comparing the nonconventional
production function in Equation 5 with
According to this production function, doubling
the varieties of intermediate-input goods will
have the same effect on output as doubling the
amount of each of those inputs, as can be seen
from the equalities
This is not the case with the proposed pro-
duction function of Equation 5, in which dou-
bling the number of varieties M doubles output,
but doubling the quantity of each intermediate
input x increases output only by a factor of 2
α ,
which is lower than 2 (recall that 0 < α < 1).
18
In other words, in Equation 5 any increase
in variety has a larger impact on aggregate pro-
duction than an identical percentage increase in
the quantities of the existing intermediate-input
varieties. Loosely speaking, this production func-
tion captures the idea that a society cannot eas-
ily compensate for the loss of variety with more
of the same old stuff. This issue is relevant to
measuring the gains from unilateral tariff removal
because freer trade policies (even if implemented
unilaterally) may give a country access to a larger
variety of goods. The welfare gains from such
policies may be important if a larger variety of
intermediate inputs, as the production function
suggests, increases the economy’s productivity in
the manufacturing of domestic goods.
In the reinterpretation (Equation 5) of the
conventional constant-returns-to-scale technol-
ogy (Equation 3), the total factor productivity
parameter A in the latter would be equal to M
before trade liberalization but eventually equal
to (M + ∆ M ) after trade liberalization, where ∆ M
represents the additional varieties of intermedi-
ate inputs resulting from freer trade.














YL M x =∗ ∗
− 1 α .
With a production function like that in
Equation 5, the gains from freer trade will come
from two sources: the traditional one that tariff
reductions will make imported intermediate
goods cheaper and thus induce higher output
levels of the existing varieties of final goods and
services, and the nonconventional one of gains
from variety from ∆ M. This second effect is a
good candidate for boosting the welfare gains
from unilateral trade liberalization beyond the
negligible to moderate results found by models
using more conventional production functions.
The remainder of this article reports the results
of recent work that has exploited this gains-
from-variety approach to build a better case for
unilateral free trade.
Measuring the Welfare Gains from Variety
In analyzing these studies on welfare gains
from product variety, it is important to under-
stand how tariffs reduce the product varieties
available to firms and consumers. All the stud-
ies discussed below assume that firms face cost
functions of the form in Equation 4. Equiva-
lently, they assume all goods are produced with
increasing-returns-to-scale technologies.
19 As
Part 1 explains, this is the only technology con-
sistent with the national product differentiation
assumption, typically introduced to account for
the cross-hauling puzzle in trade statistics.
The introduction of increasing-returns-
to-scale technologies is not inconsequential for
the potential gains from variety with a tariff
reduction. The attrition effect tariffs can have on
variety starts at much lower tariffs with increas-
ing-returns-to-scale technologies than with con-
stant-returns-to-scale technologies.
Consider a typical final-goods producer’s
demand for an imported intermediate input pro-
duced with a constant-returns-to-scale technol-
ogy, as represented in Figure 1. Recall that the
cost function will look like Equation 4, with F
equal to 0, implying a constant marginal and
unit average cost of b. Suppose that initially
there is no tariff, and the equilibrium demand of
the input is at point E0, with price b equal to the
unit and marginal cost and quantity Qx1. Next,
suppose an ad valorem tariff of τ percent is
imposed on this intermediate input. For the
sake of argument, assume the buyers absorb all
the burden of the tariff—that is, the foreign pro-
ducers of those inputs still receive a price b
(equal to their unit cost of production) for each
unit of the intermediate good they sell to
domestic buyers. These buyers will have to pay
a price b(1 + τ /100) for the imported interme-
diate input. Suppose that at the new equilibriumFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 36
price the quantity demanded, Qx2, is one-fourth
Qx1, the equilibrium quantity before the tariff was
introduced. Foreign producers will have to cut
the quantity produced by three-fourths. The ques-
tion is whether they can stay in business doing
that. The answer under constant returns to scale
is an unambiguous yes because producers will
always receive the price b for each unit, regard-
less of sales level. Since b is also the unit cost of
production, they will cover their costs and be able
to stay in business whether they sell Qx1 units (as
in point E0) or Qx2 (as in point E1). Thus, under
constant returns to scale, the available varieties of
intermediate inputs will be the same before and
after the introduction of the tariff. The only effect
of a tariff is that each intermediate input will now
be produced in a smaller amount, to match the
decline in the quantity demanded as a result of
the tariff-induced price increase. Thus, moderate
tariffs will tend not to have any visible conse-
quences for product variety under constant-
returns-to-scale technologies.
20
Consider the alternative case in which inter-
mediate inputs are produced with an increasing-
returns technology, whose cost function will look
like Equation 4. The unit cost of producing Qx1 is
greater than b by F/Qx1. Therefore, b cannot be an
equilibrium price because foreign producers of
the imported inputs would suffer a loss. Assume,
then, that the equilibrium price for the imported
intermediate inputs under increasing-returns-to-
scale technology is b + F/Qx3. The higher price
implies, of course, that the equilibrium quantity,
Qx3, will be to the left of the equilibrium quantity
under constant returns to scale, Qx1.
Now suppose the same tariff of τ percent
is levied on all imported intermediate inputs
and the tariff is borne entirely by the domestic
buyers of imported intermediate goods. As a
result, the price increases from b +  F/Qx3 to 
(1 + τ /100)(b +  F/Qx3) and the quantity de-
manded drops to Qx4. It appears, then, that the
pair (b + F/Qx3, Qx4), represented at point E3
of the demand curve in Figure 1, is a good can-
didate for the new equilibrium. But the appear-
ance of two different quantities, Qx3 and Qx4, in
this pair suggests something is wrong with that
conjecture. Indeed, unlike in the constant-returns-
to-scale case, producers of the intermediate good
experience an increase in the average unit 
production cost by cutting production of the
intermediate input from Qx3 to Qx4. In fact, the
unit costs will be b +  F/Qx4, higher than the 
b + F/Qx3 per unit they will receive from the
price inclusive of tariff (1+ τ /100)(b + F/Qx3). 
In other words, at the price (1+ τ /100)(b +
F/Qx3) producers of the imported intermediate
input will suffer a loss. Therefore, they will have
to increase the price (before tariff), say, to b +
F/Qx4. But this higher producer price will result
in a higher user price of (1+ τ /100)(b + F/Qx4),
which in turn will reduce demand for the inter-
mediate input even further. This will result in
a higher unit cost to produce the imported inter-
mediate input and lead to another round 
of increases in the domestic price of those
imports. Eventually, unit costs will keep rising at
a higher rate than the price. This shows up in
Figure 1 in the fact that for prices above b +
F/Qx3, the demand curve stays always to the left
of and below the unit average cost curve.
21 This
implies producers will always suffer a loss if
they cut production below the pretariff level
Qx3. Since the tariff reduces demand below that
level of production, the producer of the in-
termediate input will be forced out of business
and that input variety will disappear from the
market.
Thus, in contrast to the constant-returns-
to-scale case, the imposition of even a moderate
tariff in the presence of increasing returns to
scale may reduce M, the number of intermedi-
ate-input varieties available to final-goods 
producers. This is because the tariff has a “mar-
ket-size” effect on the intermediate input’s unit
production cost that was absent in the constant-
returns-to-scale technology case.
The next section discusses how these gen-
eral ideas have been implemented in recent 
studies that attempt to take into account produc-
tivity gains from variety eventually introduced by
policies of unilateral trade liberalization.
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Welfare Gains from Variety
in Static Models of International Trade
I report first a recent study by Klenow and
Rodriguez-Clare (1997) because, strictly speak-
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ing, their model is static and thus belongs to the
class discussed in Part 1 of this series. However,
I deferred discussion of this work until now
because it is one of the few available studies
that explicitly considers the potential gains from
variety when measuring the benefits of unilat-
eral trade liberalization.
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The Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare model
incorporates the product variety effect by assum-
ing that importing firms must pay a fixed cost F
to operate and a constant price b for each unit
of imported good. For all practical purposes, it is
as if the imported goods are produced according
to a cost function like that in Equation 4.
Tariffs will make imported goods more
expensive and, hence, reduce the demand for
them. By the mechanism explained earlier, this
smaller market size will eventually leave some
importing firms unable to cover their fixed
costs, forcing them to shut down. Consumers
then suffer because they can no longer find the
varieties of goods they had been purchasing.
Likewise, local producers will become less pro-
ductive, as Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare assume
a production function of the type in Equation 5
(although a much more complicated one), by
which a lower M (number of intermediate-input
varieties) results in productivity losses and, there-
fore, in lower output despite the same capital
and labor inputs.
The authors quantify the model using data
for Costa Rica and find that removal of a 10 per-
cent tariff can quadruple the gains from unilat-
eral trade liberalization compared with a model
in which product variety effects are absent. In
particular, they find that imposition of a 10 per-
cent tariff on intermediate goods leads to wel-
fare losses equal to about 2 percent of GDP, as
opposed to only 0.5 percent in lost GDP when
the variety effect is not taken into account.
Thus, incorporation of gains from variety
works in the expected direction of increasing
the welfare gains from trade liberalization but
keeps them within the moderate ranges of the
static models without the gains-from-variety
effect, as reported in Part 1.
One possible reason for the moderate
gains in the Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare model
is that the national product differentiation
assumption works against unilateral trade liber-
alization, as explained above. The model’s sta-
tic nature also could be a factor. Thus, the next
step is to see if these limitations are overcome
by dynamic models—those that incorporate the
dimension of time and, hence, saving and
investment decisions—in the context of gains-
from-variety effects.
Welfare Gains from Variety
in Dynamic Models of International Trade
Quantitative dynamic models measuring
the effects of unilateral trade liberalization do
not abound. Even fewer of them have tackled
the gains-from-variety effect. One such model is
a study on Austria by Keuschnigg and Kohler
(1996).
As explained earlier, all models of interna-
tional trade that consider tariffs’ effects on prod-
uct variety must introduce, in one way or
another, fixed costs of production. In the case of
Keuschnigg and Kohler, it is the local producers
of final domestic goods (and not importing
firms, as in Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare) that
face a fixed production cost. This assumption is
the same as in the Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare
model, except that tariffs will not change the
number of foreign varieties but of domestic
intermediate-input varieties supplied to local
producers.
Because of this fixed cost, and for the
same reasons as in the static models, tariff
reductions in Keuschnigg and Kohler increase
the market size for every good, eventually mak-
ing it profitable to import or produce varieties
unavailable before. In addition to this static
effect, Keuschnigg and Kohler introduce a
dynamic one by linking the stock of capital with
the number of product varieties.
The intuition behind this additional effect
is similar to the one given above when describ-
ing why, in the presence of a fixed cost, a fixed
factor like land may limit the number of product
varieties an economy can produce. The same
logic works here, replacing land with capital.
Suppose each firm in the economy must pay the
fixed cost Keuschnigg and Kohler assume in the
form of k units of capital. A given capital stock
K could support at most K/k product lines or
varieties. Since K is implicitly assumed fixed in
static models, any increase in varieties must
come through reduction in production costs
rather than expansions in the capital stock.
But since Keuschnigg and Kohler allow
for investment, the capital stock is not fixed. In
fact, reductions of tariffs on intermediate and
capital goods can induce a process of capital
accumulation for the reasons discussed above.
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If the capital stock increases by ∆ K as a conse-
quence of a unilateral move to trade liberaliza-
tion, the economy can eventually support the
higher number of product varieties (K + ∆ K )/k.
This capital accumulation effect induces gains
from variety in Keuschnigg and Kohler beyond
those induced by the market-size effect present
in static models described earlier.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 38
Keuschnigg and Kohler calibrate their
model to Austrian data and find that removing a
10 percent average tariff would result in welfare
gains equal to about a 4 percent increase 
in GNP if the scale economies are fairly large (or
if fixed costs are fairly big).
25 This is more than
two times the gains in the Klenow and
Rodriguez-Clare static model.
The larger welfare gains in Keuschnigg
and Kohler again demonstrate that omitting the
time dimension and capital accumulation may
lead to a fairly sizable underestimation of the
benefits of unilateral trade liberalization. 
However, like many models reported
above, Keuschnigg and Kohler’s does not pro-
duce striking welfare gains. The potential for
positive terms-of-trade effects from the national
product differentiation assumption may be
responsible for this. In fact, Keuschnigg and
Kohler report that with a milder terms-of-trade
effect, the gains from removing a 10 percent
average tariff could be as large as 7 percent of
GNP.
It is important to remember that the gains-
from-variety effect may be a dangerous concept
to play with. However beneficial to the case for
unilateral trade liberalization, it may paradoxi-
cally undermine the very case for free market
policies that it is meant to buttress. This litera-
ture typically appeals to increasing returns to
scale, and, in the presence of such technology,




Free trade advocates consider the denial
of fast-track authority to the U.S. president a
worrisome development. The concern is that
lack of interest in multilateral trade agreements
will create a backlash against the free trade 
policies Latin American countries adopted in 
the 1990s. The fear is warranted if each country
in the region perceives it will experience 
welfare losses from adopting free trade 
policies when some if its major trading partners
do not.
This series of two articles has examined
the potential gains or losses from unilateral
trade liberalization predicted by general equilib-
rium models of international trade. Negligible 
to moderate gains are found in static as well
as dynamic models that do not incorporate
gains from product variety. The results confirm
that the omission of the dimension of time 
and, hence, of capital accumulation can under-
mine the case for unilateral trade liberalization.
Dynamic models that incorporate gains-
from-variety effects seem to have more potential
for delivering nonnegligible welfare gains. At
the same time, these models include significant
increasing-returns-to-scale technologies, a some-
what problematic feature because it opens the
door to government intervention and may
undermine the case for free market policies that
the gains-from-variety effect is meant to boost.
A clear message from the quantitative
experiments these two articles report is that nei-
ther the introduction of time nor of product
variety effects can completely overpower the
strong force against unilateral removal of tariffs
introduced in almost all models by the national
product differentiation assumption.
The strength of such a force is suspect,
especially in models that assume monopolistic
competition. As explained in Part 1, that
assumption puts the market power at the firm—
rather than at the country—level, which, in
principle, should weaken the case for trade bar-
riers introduced by the national product differ-
entiation assumption. Perhaps more weight
should be given to the models discussed in this
article that mitigate the country market power
effect of national product differentiation. These
models deliver moderate to sizable welfare
gains from unilateral trade liberalization.
Thus, the advantages of unilateral trade
liberalization are cause for optimism. But to the
extent that country market power is perceived
as important in evaluating alternative trade poli-
cies, countries may balk at the prospect of a
unilateral free trade policy. Hence, the suspen-
sion or slow progress of negotiations for multi-
lateral trade agreements is cause for concern.
The measures of welfare gains (or costs)
from unilateral trade liberalization policies pre-
sented in this article should be considered with
caution for several reasons. First, dynamic mod-
els generally pose formidable technical chal-
lenges that—in the particular applications dis-
cussed in this article—have been circumvented
with not completely appealing shortcuts.
Second, the theoretical foundations of the
national product differentiation assumption and
the bias it introduces against unilateral trade lib-
eralization remain controversial, especially in
models that assume a monopolistically compet-
itive market structure. Furthermore, the empiri-
cal measures of the market power implicit in
such an assumption are imprecise. Certainly,
international trade researchers still have a lot of
work to do before the benefits of unilateral
trade liberalization policies can be confidently
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improved the contents and organization of the ideas 
in both articles of this series. Any remaining errors are,
of course, mine.
1 As Part 1 explains, the equivalent variation in income
is the change in income that consumers should experi-
ence without a trade liberalization to replicate the level
of utility they would attain with it. A negative equivalent
variation in income implies that consumers are worse
off after trade liberalization.
2 Although this model is frequently put in the applied
general equilibrium category, it does not strictly belong
there because it implicitly assumes an excess supply
of labor (that is, the labor market is in disequilibrium)
in Mexico, at least before NAFTA.
3 One of the first authors to implement this approach in the
context of a small open economy was Mendoza (1991).
4 The alternative assumption that β is an increasing
function of ct is not less problematic, as it creates the
possibility of multiple equilibria, an issue beyond the
scope of this article.
5 As explained in Part 1, concavity is a mathematical
property that captures the idea that consumers have a
taste for variety.
6 The counterpart for the lack of stationarity of the con-
sumption–income ratio with a constant β is the lack of
stationarity of the wealth–income ratio.
7 The introduction of money in the utility function has
been justified as a shortcut to capture the notion that
money facilitates trade. In fact, Feenstra (1986) shows
that under certain conditions, transaction costs in
trade will operate as if money were an argument of the
utility function. However, the same reasoning applies if
transaction costs are associated with buying and sell-
ing bonds or equities. It is on these grounds that
Poterba and Rotemberg (1987), for example, include
short-term government debt (and not just fiat money)
in the utility function. This shortcut to modeling trans-
action costs explicitly may be useful for addressing
certain monetary policy questions, but its application
to the issue of the welfare consequences of alternative
trade policies is more controversial.
8 For the reasons given in Part 1, consumption growth
may not be a good measure of well-being, particularly
in models in which labor supply is endogenous. For
example, households may consume more after trade
liberalization but also work harder, so the welfare gains
may not be nearly as large as the increase in con-
sumption would otherwise suggest. That’s why most
applied studies of international trade, like Goulder and
Eichengreen’s, report the equivalent variation in
income rather than the actual variation in income (or
GDP).
9 I arrived at this figure by assuming that the change in
consumption from a removal of tariffs will be a linear
function of the original average tariff rate for tariffs in
the 0 percent to 10 percent range.
10 Both models assume several sectors, but the details of
the disaggregation and technologies in each of them
differ. Both models introduce frictions in the investment
process but differ in the details. Goulder and
Eichengreen assume that changing the capital stock
from its current level is costly in terms of resources,
while Ahearne assumes it is costly in terms of time—
that is, that it takes several periods to bring the capital
stock to the desired level.
11 As Part 1 discusses, Japan may appear to import and
export cars simply because of the way trade 
statistics are reported. For example, Japan could be
importing convertibles and exporting vans. Although
these are different products, they might appear simply
as “cars” in the broad categories used in trade statis-
tics, giving rise to an apparent cross-hauling puzzle.
12 Unfortunately, none of these authors report an optimal
tariff for their models. One conjecture worth exploring
is that the 4 percent initial tariff Goulder and
Eichengreen assume in their benchmark case is much
closer to the optimal tariff than the 25 percent rate
Ahearne assumes. Obviously, removing an optimal tar-
iff will cause welfare losses while removing a nonopti-
mal one might enhance welfare.
13 In fairness, Ahearne himself reports that GDP gains in
his model are more moderate under limited interna-
tional capital mobility.
14 As explained in the previous section, trade liberaliza-
tion can result in a higher capital stock, which implies
a higher use of capital input in the production process.
15 It is important to note that models of monopolistic
competition (as opposed to perfect competition) have
established rigorously how the number of goods and
the amount produced of each will be determined in a
decentralized economy, using two conditions: that
each firm will maximize profits by producing the output
level at which the marginal revenue equals the marginal
cost, and that free entry ensures that in equilibrium no
firm will capture monopolistic rents. For a didactic pre-
sentation of this material, see Krugman and Obstfeld
(1991), chapter 6.
16 This assumption is only for expositional convenience.
Strictly speaking, it is a result, not an assumption, that
can be obtained as the equilibrium outcome of a
monopolistic competition model in which final goods
are produced from inputs that enter symmetrically (that
is, have the same elasticity of substitution) in a con-
stant elasticity substitution production function. For a
more formal discussion, see Romer (1987).
17 Ethier (1982) was among the first to propose production
functions of this type. For a nontechnical but persua-
sive presentation of the benefits of variety in produc-
tion and consumption, see Cox and Alm (1999).FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 40




19 Recall that under increasing-returns-to-scale tech-
nologies, in contrast to constant-returns-to-scale tech-
nologies, the average unit cost declines with the quan-
tity produced.
20 The tariff will affect M only if it gets so high that the
price b(1+ τ /100) is at or above the demand curve’s
intersection with the vertical axes, where the equilib-
rium quantity demanded will be zero. As anticipated,
the tariff need not be that high to affect product variety
in the presence of increasing-returns-to-scale tech-
nologies.
21 For a situation like this to emerge, the demand curve
must intersect the vertical axis. Not all utility functions
will induce that property. For example, the demand
functions induced by the logarithmic utility functions in
Part 1 never intersect the vertical axis. Of course, the
studies in Part 2 specify utility functions that do induce
that property on the demand for the relevant goods.
22 Recall that the parameter M, the number of varieties in
the nonconventional production function (Equation 5),
can be interpreted as a measure of the overall effi-
ciency of technology because it plays the same role
as A, the total factor productivity parameter, in the
more standard production function (Equation 3).
23 The Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare model contains
many interesting details that cannot be discussed here
without sacrificing the focus of the article. Therefore, I
sketch only those features of the model whose under-
standing is essential to trace the fundamental forces
behind its welfare results.
24 Because Keuschnigg and Kohler use an overlapping
generation model, they do not have to confront
Ahearne’s difficulty of how to introduce the time prefer-
ence parameter β in agents that never die.
25 The welfare gains were computed taking into account
that the capital stock will gradually adjust to its new
long-run equilibrium level after the trade reform is
implemented.
26 In more technical terms, the Second Welfare theorem
does not hold under increasing returns to scale; there-
fore, a Pareto optimum cannot typically be imple-
mented by a free market economy. Dixit and Stiglitz
(1977) show, for example, that corrective measures
could involve taxes on some goods and subsidies on
others. By analogy, it is not difficult to envision environ-
ments in which the remedies would involve tariffs on
some imports and subsidies on some exports.
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